Abstract: This article examines two cases of state funding cuts to the most prominent and active Arab community organisations operating in Canada, the Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House. It contextualises the cuts within broader ‗crisis of multiculturalism' debates imbued with anti-Arab/anti-Muslim racism and the silencing of Palestine advocacy efforts; arguing that the shift to a neoliberal multiculturalism, emptied of anti-racist politics, along with the construction of national identities around a set of western ‗core values' has advanced a marginalising politics that demarcates a ‗civilisational' border which excludes Arabs, Muslims, and by extension Palestine solidarity. Curtailing freedom of expression, partly through funding cuts, thus becomes a key mechanism for disciplining dissent in racialised communities.
‗prevent town hall boycotts' through changes to local council public procurement policy and pension schemes. 3 In the US, legislation attempts to exclude organisations that support the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign from public funding or contracts. 4 Therefore, the Canadian experience over the last decade provides a powerful foreshadowing of processes that are now emerging in Europe and the United States.
In addition to locating the funding cuts in Canada in terms of the generalised attack on pro-Palestinian activism, the article also relates the cuts to the attack on multiculturalism internationally. 5 And here it is necessary to distinguish between antiracist notions of multiculturalism, often brought about by struggles of racialised groups, and neoliberal notions of multiculturalism, which amount to ‗culturalism', celebration of specific cultural tropes (dance, song, food) at the expense of broader structural inequalities, including institutionalised racism. For multiculturalism is a contested term and has shifted historically and suffered a serious backlash more recently.
This backlash against official multiculturalism in western states has entailed a new framing of national identity around a set of core western values demarcating a ‗civilisational' border, which facilitates the exclusion of Arabs and Muslim, and by extension community organisations representing them. Unlike policies of the 1950s and ‗60s, which demanded cultural assimilation, the new emphasis on creating ‗Britishness' or ‗Canadianness' is framed in terms of ‗core values' which minorities must assimilate.
When it comes to Arab/Muslim community organisations, the assimilation entails remaining silent about issues of foreign policy, community surveillance and racial profiling. A set of racialised discursive and administrative disciplining mechanisms, including funding cuts, is utilised against organisations refusing such assimilation.
Although there are very important differences between the European and North
American debates on multicultural policy, stemming from the different types of migration to both areas, the parameters around which such debates are conducted have tended to intersect; with the backlash against multiculturalism often stressing its promotion of ‗ethnic enclaves' and ‗segregated communities'. Such ‗integration debates' as Sivanandan has accurately pointed out are about a ‗descent into assimilation, under cover of -community cohesion‖, with British values as the yardstick of measurement'. 6 Underlying the debates, calling for a different type of multiculturalism (in the Canadian case an integrative multiculturalism framed around ‗core liberal values'), or repeatedly declaring its failure (in the European case), is usually an essentialised Muslim/Arab figure that is unable to integrate into western society and adapt to a new value system. Liz Fekete has intricately described the ‗new popular ‗common sense' racism against Muslims and foreigners' invoked in such debates on integration: ‗it is a racism that builds on the proliferation of stereotypical generalisations about ‗Muslim culture' and the Islamic mind-set that have been generated over the last decade.' 7 As
Arat-Koc explained the so-called war on terror ‗jettisoned those of Arab and Muslim 10 This has mainly crystalised in the increased securitisation of state / community relations, the rushing through of anti-terror legislation, mainly aimed at Arabs and Muslims, and the curtailment of civil liberties.
While such direct disciplining mechanisms have received a level of attention, less recognised is the more subtle censorship of activities and groups deemed outside a core set of western values.
Multicultural funding,, which encourages community organisations to become more dependent on state funding and less interested in building anti-racist solidarities across communities, is often an important disciplining mechanism. Inevitably, community groups' focus turns to survival and ‗service provision' as they become more vulnerable and susceptible to the exercise of state discipline.
Methodologically, in reconstructing the narrative behind the funding cuts this paper relies on: official correspondence between the organisations and government departments; media reports, including op-ed and editorials; statements from party Research, a private company, to evaluate the multiculturalism programme. One of the pivotal recommendations of its report was on funding, noting that ‗past funding practices have reinforced the impression that multiculturalism is a programme of special interests'. 14 In the subsequent three years, the programme was redesigned in line with the report's recommendations, so that funding would be provided on a project by project basis. Less money was therefore available to fund the general and autonomous operations of community groups. Ethnocultural communities were still eligible for funding, but they had to address the new objectives and compete with private entities when applying for funding. Organisations applying for funds had to craft each project to meet funding criteria, thus losing a measure of autonomy and forced to focus on ‗servicing clients.'
By 1998, the programme's objectives focused less on preserving cultural identity and working with community groups dedicated to single communities; instead, the goal was to ‗inculcate an attachment to Canada (as opposed to cultural maintenance) and to create active citizens'. 15 Ethnocultural organisations did not support this shift at the time. In fact, the Canadian Ethnocultural Council criticised the shift, arguing that community groups were not consulted, and that the Brighton Report failed to address the issue of ongoing funding cuts to multicultural programming to begin with. Kundnani argues that a similar process took place in Britain as well:
[the] new conventional wisdom is that a national story of Britishness must be promoted in order to bind the nation together around a set of core values, to which minorities must assimilate. This integrationism draws on a wider antiMuslim political culture associated with the ‗war on terror', in which the focus is on ‗self-segregation', alien values and forced assimilation, rather than on institutional racism.
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The idea of common values between Canada and Israel also increased in popularity among Canadian politicians, and was fundamental to the new ideological construction of the relationship between the two states. Thus, the reorientation of citizenship and belonging around ‗values' had significance in transforming international alliances and the repositioning of Canada in a ‗civilisational' camp. According to a CIC report evaluating the multiculturalism programme, the updated guide ‗strengthens the content on common Canadian values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the equality of men and women'. 25 Moreover, right after the guide was reissued, ‗an advertisement campaign on citizenship was launched which emphasised the meaning of being Canadian and the importance of Canada's values, symbols, institutions and history'. 26 The use of the guide in the context of a letter issued to review organisational funding underlines the use of such seemingly benign guides in disciplining communities.
One of the avenues in which this articulation of citizenship was presented was

Defunding the Canadian Arab Federation
Arab community organisations were historically organised through the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF), and the Palestinian community was specifically involved with the Palestine House Educational and Cultural Centre (which is a member group of CAF). House, the organisation received a letter explaining that it was losing funding because of actions ‗that could arguably be seen as extreme'. 27 The following section traces the history and reasoning for those funding cuts, addressing the way both organisations given that multiculturalism is premised on the equal treatment and respect of all citizens, Canada needs to consider how the security agenda and multiculturalism can co-exist. To date, the former has come at the expense of the latter . . . we need to determine, as a society, how to combine our desire to respect human rights and multiculturalism with our need to protect our security and trade interests. Serious concerns have arisen with respect to certain public statements that have been made by yourself or other officials of the CAF. These statements have included the promotion of hatred, anti-Semitism and support for the banned terrorist organisations Hamas and Hezbollah. The objectionable nature of these public statements in that they appear to reflect the CAF's evident support for terrorist organisations and positions on its part which are arguably anti-Semitic raises serious questions about the integrity of your organisation and has undermined the government's confidence in the CAF as an appropriate partner for the delivery of settlement services to newcomers.
reference to anti-terror legislation. In other words, the statement is based on the perceptions and biases of the minister in charge, not on any formal investigation that CAF was given a right to respond to. The use of terms such as ‗terrorist' and ‗anti-Semitism' provided a context in which even liberal notions of due process and impartiality could simply be ignored. This is a common mechanism used throughout cases of censorship against Palestine solidarity outside Canada as well.
In the legal proceedings that followed CAF's application to the federal court for an interim injunction, the court did find that minister Kenney may have breached his legal duty to act fairly towards CAF. Justice Kelen, who presided over the case, made it clear that it would be inappropriate for the minister to cut CAF's funding because its President had called the minister a name, stating:
Being a target of public criticism is part of holding public office. If the minister decided to cancel the English as a Second Language funding contract for the Canadian Arab community simply because he was called a name . . . his decision should not stand. It was not unexpected that the Arab community would be repulsed by Israel's invasion of Gaza . . . the Arab community was upset that the Canadian government did not strongly protest this attack. Many reputable Canadian Jews were similarly opposed to [the] attack. 35 In its decision, the court stated that the minister was legally obligated to advise CAF of his reasons for intending to cancel the contract, to provide CAF with a full opportunity to respond, and to fairly take into account this response before making his final decision. Minister Kenney took only the procedural lesson to heart; as will be explained below, for later funding cuts to Palestine House, he sent a letter warning that The letter noted that the settlement programme was not only for language training, ‗it also facilitates the settlement and social, cultural, economic and civic integration of sometimes vulnerable and impressionable immigrants and refugees into Canadian
Society.' The letter also stated, ‗we expect that a service provider will conduct itself in a manner that could not be perceived as extreme or endorsing violence against any person or group,' adding that the review will take into account actions, statements, and positions that ‗may be incompatible with CIC's interest in providing services to new Canadians, free of any association with extreme political activity or views'. 36 The letter did not specify how the review would be conducted, or importantly, what constituted ‗extreme' activity and political views.
The letter went on to stress three actions that the ministry found objectionable, explaining that ‗Palestine House has a history of taking positions that could be interpreted as extreme or supportive of terrorists and terrorism and viewed as offensive to newcomers and to many Canadians'. 37 The incidents cited in the letter as With the rise of increasingly exclusionary nationalisms, discussions on multiculturalism and anti-racist alliances are urgently needed beyond a binary of for or against multiculturalism. A multiculturalism not embedded within anti-racist politics can amount to a neoliberal celebration of marketable diversity at the expense of social and economic justice. It is not merely a ‗recognition' and ‗tolerance' that the state can dictate, manipulate, fund and sanction that will resolve issue of institutionalised racism.
Without substantively addressing relations of power, especially the ways in which exclusion and silencing operate, the dominant framing of national identity in western states around core values will continue to act as a veil for the status quo, condemning those outside the mainstream to a position of permanent marginalisation.
